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Abstract. This paper develops a representation-theoretic notion of spatial 
context for cognitive agents that interact with spatial environments. We discuss 
the state of the art in defining context as used in context-aware and / or 
location-aware systems. In contrast to existing approaches, we define context 
through cognitive processes. Placing cognitive processes in the focus of our 
context definition allows for a truly user-centered perspective: conceptuali-
zations imbue spatial structures with meaning. This allows for fixing termino-
logical problems and relating context definitions to work in spatial information 
theory and cognitive science. Although we focus on spatial context, the 
approach is generic and can be adapted to other domains in which cognitive 
aspects concerning users of information systems are central. 
1 Introduction 
Context has become an omnipresent notion in human-computer interaction (HCI) 
research. Geographic information systems and services are concerned in particular 
with context-aware or location-aware systems. The general idea of context research is 
to adapt the reasoning of a system / service to current requirements (e.g. location and / 
or task), and hence, to make the information generated by the system more useful for 
its user. 
It has been considered difficult, however, to define what constitutes context. 
Popular definitions remain unspecific, and most attempts to fill the concept of context 
with meaning do it by examples, or – more systematically – by a taxonomy of aspects 
of context. As a consequence, the list of influencing factors of possible constituents of 
context get out of hand instead of rendering the concept of context more precise,. 
In the present paper we take an orthogonal approach. Rather than decomposing 
context effects into the different aspects that may play a role we define context in 
terms of the cognitive architecture that determines the interactions between the 
components involved. As a starting point, we use cognitive processes that allow for a 
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characterization of context, in particular spatial context. From such an operational 
definition of context we expect a better understanding of context effects and on 
requirements to be taken into account when dealing with context. 
The paper is structured as follows: We briefly introduce the notion of context as 
found in the ubiquitous computing literature and point out weaknesses of current 
context definitions. On this basis we develop a cognitive architecture for wayfinding 
problems to exemplify interactions that take place in human spatial problem solving. 
We discuss the trilateral relationship between an environment, a cognitive agent, and 
a cartographic map and the interactions that take place between these three entities. 
On this basis we define spatial context. We conclude by discussing possible 
applications and give an outlook how this approach can be used to overcome 
deficiencies in more general context definitions. 
2 The notion of context in ubiquitous computing 
Spatial context came into the focus of research with the concept of ubiquitous 
computing (Weiser, 1991). Ubiquitous computing aims to provide services 
everywhere and at any time that take into account features of the actual environment 
and situation; hence, ubiquitous computing requires information about the 
environment as well as about the situation and goals of the cognitive agent. For that 
purpose, ubiquitous computing concepts employ sensors that collect data on the user’s 
location as well as environmental parameters. Interface design research has been 
aware of the separation of the physical environment and its representation in digital 
space for a long time (cf. Ishii & Ullmer, 1997). However, this separation usually 
reflects the provider’s perspective and ignores the individual user with her knowledge, 
abilities, focus of attention, or emotions. For example, a mobile navigation system 
that only considers the environment and its representation in digital space would 
neither take into account the cognitive map of the user nor her spatial abilities. 
The term ‘context’ itself has become ubiquitous in the research literature. It is used 
in combinations such as ‘context-aware’ systems (Abowd et al., 1997; Dey, 1998; 
Kjeldskov et al., 2003), or, for specific contexts such as location, in respective 
combinations such as ‘location-aware’ systems (e.g., Nicklas et al., 2001; Want & 
Schilit, 2001; Winter, 2003). The frequently cited survey by Chen and Kotz (2000) 
clarifies that context-awareness means that applications have to adapt to changing 
context instead of producing prefabricated content. For example, a (location-aware) 
mobile navigation system adapts automatically to the changing location of the mobile 
user and specifies route directions with respect to this location without further user 
interaction. In contrast, a web service for locating street addresses might come up 
with a similar map, but will not be considered context-aware since all parameters have 
to be explicitly specified by the user without taking into account the location at which 
the query is specified. Other authors distinguish between reactive systems that adapt 
to the current context, and proactive systems that anticipate future context (Mayrhofer 
et al., 2003). In any case, time, location, and change play an important role for 
context.  
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In this literature, almost all authors agree that it is difficult to define the term 
‘context’. A generally accepted definition does not exist and the term is frequently 
used with unspecific meaning. According to Dey (1998), context is “any information 
that can be used to characterize the situation of entities that are considered relevant to 
the interaction between a user and an application, including the user and the 
application themselves.” To precisiate the concept of ‘context’ the literature has 
developed taxonomies of aspects that together form context. The influential taxonomy 
by Schilit et al. (1994) names spatial context (where you are), social context (who you 
are with), and computing context (what resources are nearby), a taxonomy that is 
widely considered incomplete (see, e.g., Chen & Kotz, 2000). Alternatively, Dix et al. 
(2000) distinguish infrastructure context, system context, domain context, and 
physical context. This illustrates that the categorization of the notion ‘context’ in turn 
depends on the specific context for which the notion is used; there seems to be no 
natural categorization of context. Categorizations of context frequently are made ad-
hoc without formal methodology, and hence without proof of completeness or 
relevance.  
Some of the aspects of context identified in ubiquitous computing now receive 
attention in the spatial information theory literature. Among the first is cultural 
context in cross-language studies (Levinson, 2003; Mark, Skupin, & Smith, 2001; 
Mark & Turk, 2003). Another one is temporal and spatial context in characterizing the 
salience of spatial features (Elias, 2003; Winter et al., 2005). This literature typically 
avoids defining or categorizing specific features of context. 
Dix et al. (2000) acknowledge that context-awareness is not a question of a system 
interface, but of the broader circumstances in which the system is applied, including 
the physical environment. From that perspective they focus on location. They 
consider location and environment in terms both of the physical space and its 
representation in the map system. They implicitly introduce what we will call 
‘environment’ by means of nearness and set up an algebraic specification for the type 
space, consisting of location, nearness, and regions, and for the type world, consisting 
of spaces and bodies. With these elements they set up a kind of top-level ontology of 
spatial context in the environment in the mind of a wayfinder or in the system that 
computes maps. So far, this is the only formal approach to define spatial context in 
ubiquitous computing. 
Instead of providing a new taxonomy for contexts we will investigate in the 
following sections how contexts are created and used; this will help us to provide an 
operational definition of context. When we focus on spatial context, we follow Dix et 
al. in their argumentation that spatial relations form a fundamental aspect of context 
for location-aware systems.  
3 The relation between spatial environment, cognitive agent, and 
cartographic map 
Let us now render the notion of spatial context more precise. In contrast to 
approaches that are concerned with the potential factors contributing to context, we 
will detail the cognitive and computational functions of negotiating knowledge in a 
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complex system. This system distinguishes the major components in which these 
different factors may play a role. We will discuss the roles of spatial contexts in the 
framework of the trilateral relationship between a spatial environment, a cognitive 
agent interacting with this environment, and an external representation of that 
environment (specifically: a map) that the agent may use to support this interaction. 
Why are maps useful for our spatial orientation in an environment in which we are 
immersed and to which we have direct visual access? To answer this question, we will 
look at the kinds of entities and structures that are involved in solving orientation and 
wayfinding tasks. We will distinguish between the spatial environment E, in which 
the orientation or wayfinding task is to be carried out; the cognitive agent A – a 
person or a robot – who carries out the task; and the map M that serves as a tool for 
performing the task. These three entities are involved in rather sophisticated cognitive 
interaction processes when we use maps to solve orientation or wayfinding problems.  
To reduce the complexity in presenting this trilateral relationship, we will carry out 
a Gedankenexperiment involving the three entities E, A, and M in the paradigm of 
synthetic psychology as introduced by Braitenberg (1984) and discussed for spatial 
communication with maps, for example by Frank (2000). We will begin with a simple 
configuration and analyze interaction processes that may take place in this 
configuration; we then will gradually augment the configuration and we will 
investigate from a knowledge representation-theoretic perspective in which ways the 
augmentation influences the interactions. On this basis we develop a representation-
theoretic characterization of spatial context applicable to spatial reasoning and spatial 
interaction.  
3.1 An agent without cognition in a spatial environments 
The Gedankenexperiment starts by considering a spatial environment E and primitive 
agents A (amoebas or other abulic agents) to whom we would not concede any 
cognitive capabilities. How do amoebas move in a spatial environment? In a 
structured environment, their tracks will not be equally distributed random spatial 
configurations; rather, the tracks will be influenced by the initial position and by the 
physical structure and the physical forces acting in the environment. For example, if 
the environment consists of hills and water streams, the movements of the amoebae 
are guided to follow the spatio-temporal course of the water streams. Those parts of 
the spatial environment that influence the motion of the amoeba belong to the spatial 
situation context of the amoeba. The abulic agent completely depends on the 
affordances of the environment that will determine where they move (cf., Gibson, 
1979). This can be regarded as a weak version of “knowledge in the world” (e.g., 
Norman, 1980; Raubal & Worboys, 1999); it also can detail the very origin of this 
knowledge.  
Although we discuss movements in our Gedankenexperiment, we will not 
emphasize the issue of temporal context and of changing knowledge about the 
environment, here,  
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3.2 A cognitive agent without mental representation of its spatial environment 
How does the situation change when we replace the primitive agent by a cognitive 
agent – specifically by a human being or a cognitive robot? The physical affordances 
of the environment will still determine to a large extent where the agent will move 
(see Fig. 1): one of the fundamental aspects of affordance, of course, is gravity; it will 
keep the agent on the ground, for the most part. Other aspects are passages that are 
easy to traverse and obstacles that will prevent the agent from moving to certain 
places. Besides the affordances imposed by the environment certain affordances are 
imposed by size, shape, and abilities of the agent: the agent can perform certain 
movements on the basis of its anatomy and physiology; certain other movements are 
not possible. In general, affordances are determined by the interaction between agents 
and their environments: for instance, the size of an agent interacts with the size of a 
passage: the relationship between these sizes will determine the affordance of certain 
movements between the agent and the environment. 
E
A
 
Fig 1. Affordances emerge in the interaction between environment (E) and agent (A). 
Let us now consider the cognitive side of the agent: the agent wants to move to some 
specific location in the environment, say to the exit of the building he is in. Agents 
with low-level cognition (e.g., insects or reactive robots) may employ rather primitive 
reactive mechanisms to move to their destination that do not require an internal 
representation of their environment in their minds (e.g., Brooks, 1991); thus, simple 
cognitive affordances relating to the agent’s perception and action capabilities can be 
engaged in addition to the purely physical affordances discussed in the previous 
section. 
3.3 A cognitive agent with mental representation of its spatial environment 
Higher cognitive animals like rats, humans, or cognitive robots build up internal 
representations of their environment (frequently referred to as cognitive maps) that 
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help them to plan and control their movements in space (see Fig. 2). If a wayfinder’s 
destination is not directly accessible to perception, a mental representation that 
functions as a memory for the structure of the environment is necessary to plan and 
carry out actions that will get the agent to its destination. Certain aspects of the spatial 
structure of the environment are represented in the memory of the cognitive agent to 
allow him, her, or it to reflect about the world and to plan actions to be carried out in 
the spatial environment.  
Why is it economical to represent aspects of the world in which we are immersed? 
The answer is simple: if we can use a mental representation as a model of an 
environment we can carry out certain operations mentally that would otherwise 
require physical actions in the spatial environment itself. Besides the savings of 
physical energy and time through mental operations, there may be advantages due to 
suitable representation structures (Sloman, 1985), as these mental structures are not 
replicas of the environment. In addition, mental operations may be much less 
dangerous and harmful than the corresponding physical actions.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Two worlds and a representation (correspondence) relation (cf. Palmer, 1978). In this 
example the arrows indicate the relation ‘further north than’. 
In short: we have information about the spatial environment twice: in the world and 
in the mind. The two information sources are connected through a representational 
correspondence (Palmer, 1978). Certain tasks are achieved more economically by 
taking a ‘shortcut’ through the mental representation than by taking action in the 
environment. 
3.4 A cognitive agent with mental representation of its spatial environment 
and a map 
From the perspective of cognitive architecture the situation becomes much more 
complex when a map as a third element is integrated. If information about the 
environment is available in two incarnations – in the environment and in its mental 
representation – why do we need maps to find our way? A map is a third source of 
information about the spatial environment besides the two we dealt with in the 
Environment Mental Representation 
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previous section. The answer is simple again: a map enables a cognitive agent to solve 
spatial problems that he can solve neither by inspecting the environment nor by 
inspecting its mental representation. 
A map can replace neither the environment nor its mental representation; however, 
a map can extend our cognitive capabilities in certain settings (e.g., Scaife & Rogers, 
1996): (1) a map can provide information about environments which we are not 
immersed in and / or which we have never seen before; (2) a map can provide 
information about environments we have seen before but whose details have escaped 
our mind; and (3) a map can provide information about environments we are 
immersed in for which it may be difficult or impossible to get an overview; it enables 
us to get a global view of the environment that allows us to apply certain spatial 
reasoning mechanisms. Thus, a map can extend our mental representation of an 
environment and our mental representation can interact with this external 
representation to extend the range of problems we can solve.  
We now have three sources of information about the spatial environment: the 
environment E itself, the mental representation of the agent A, and the external 
representation in form of a map M. The three information sources each are in a 
correspondence relation to the other two; these relations are depicted in Fig. 3: 
E M
A
C3
C2C1
 
Fig. 3. The relation C1 establishes a correspondence between the environment E and the mental 
representation of agent A; C2 establishes a correspondence between this mental representation 
and the map M; and through composition of C1 and C2, C3 sets some aspects of the 
environment E in relation to the map M. 
 
The correspondences between the three sources of spatial information are established 
in different ways: C1 is more or less hardwired by means of the agent’s sensory 
organs and / or established in early phases of getting acquainted with spatial 
environments (e.g., Clark, 1973; Wilson, 2002); in humans, the correspondence 
established by our perceptual / cognitive machinery becomes so strong that we 
sometimes are unable to distinguish between ‘what is out there’ in the real 
environment and what we know about it; a single correspondence relation is 
established. 
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The relation C2 is different in that it is not specified by the development of the 
perceptual apparatus: making and interpreting external representations of mental 
images is an art cognitive agents develop much later and there is not one ‘natural’ 
way of externalizing mental images or of interpreting external spatial representations. 
A variety of correspondence relations can be established here. A map can be 
conceived of as an abstract picture that can be interpreted in different ways and 
independently of the represented environment. A cognitive agent can use a map to 
reason about spatial relations even if no corresponding spatial environment exists; the 
relation C2 can be substituted for the relation C1 in such a way that the map becomes 
the target spatial environment or the representation of a fantasy world. 
The correspondence relation C3 between the environment and the map 
representation is different again: it is established by the agent on a high cognitive 
level by composing the relations C1 and C2. An external depiction of something is 
never a representation by virtue of the intrinsic properties of the ‘something’ and the 
depiction; it becomes a representation by explicitly establishing correspondence 
relations (Furbach et al., 1985; Palmer, 1978). 
As we pursue a cognitive perspective, we will only consider cognitively relevant 
aspects of these three entities with respect to the spatial tasks to be solved. In the 
environment E, these are the locations of physical objects present, their spatial 
relations with respect to each other, their shape and other properties of appearance, 
their visibility, their uniqueness and / or their distinctiveness in the environment, and 
possibly further aspects. Regarding agent A, we are concerned about (1) perceptual 
spatial abilities (specifically vision and audition, and possibly the sense of smell); (2) 
spatial memory abilities (specifically the ability to remember previously perceived 
environments and / or representations of environments); (3) abstraction abilities (in 
particular: abilities to develop a mental image of a real environment, to generate and 
interpret maps, and to relate the different representations); (4) imagery abilities 
(mental ‘visualization’ of those memories); (5) mental reasoning abilities 
(transformation of perception and memories into other forms); (6) spatial action 
abilities (the transformation of new insights about the spatial environment into 
physical actions in the environment; (7) spatial interaction abilities (abilities to 
communicate with other cognitive agents about spatial situations); these abilities 
involve (8) abilities to relate and integrate spaces of different scale and type: table top 
space, vista space, environmental space, ... (Montello, 1993) and (9) abilities to 
employ different spatial reference systems (Levinson, 1996) and to transform from 
one reference system to another. In the map M, we are concerned about adequate 
symbols and relations for depicting and interpreting spatial relations in a consistent 
and unambiguous way. 
3.5 Cognitive processes related to the three spatial information sources 
So far, we discussed representational correspondences as if they were static 
relationships. However, in as far as they are established by cognitive processes, we 
should point out the importance of dynamic aspects in establishing representational 
correspondences in spatial domains. The affordances of the spatial environment 
determine to a large extent how people perceive an environment, as we interpret the 
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world largely in terms of its functions and its presumed ‘purposes’. They are 
important to generate expectations about what will or what might happen next. For 
humans, a small pathway in a meadow may be more salient and memorable than large 
branches of a tree while for birds and monkeys it may be the other way around; thus 
actual or potential actions and events structure the environment into relevant and 
irrelevant aspects (e.g., Richardson & Spivey, 2000). 
The actions and events that may take place in the environment are reflected in 
mental capabilities in human mental representations: we can imagine the same type of 
actions and events mentally; in fact, it is much easier for us to imagine realistic events 
like a person walking down a pathway by mental simulation than fictional events like 
the disintegration or reconfiguration of the environment. Similarly, we use external 
maps to physically simulate actions like journeys by moving our finger across the line 
symbols that correspond to the pathways of the journey in the real environment or we 
mentally simulate such actions by traversing these line symbols with our visual 
perception and attention apparatus.  
These examples and other evidence suggest that the spatial correspondence 
between different information sources is particularly useful for establishing a direct 
process correspondence between processes in the spatial environment, perceptual 
attention processes in vista space and table-top space, mental imagery processes, and 
manipulation processes in table-top space (Freksa, 2004). 
4 Spatial context 
In the foregoing sections we established a general representation-theoretic framework 
involving a spatial environment, one or more cognitive agents, and external 
representations of the spatial environment; we will now use this framework to 
characterize various types of spatial context without differentiating between different 
aspects that may be involved in these contexts; instead, we will distinguish types of 
contexts on the basis of their role in the framework.  
It is evident that in different cognitive domains different aspects are relevant and 
therefore different contexts apply; in our case we are interested in contexts in the 
environment, in the mental representation of the agent, in the external map 
representation, and in their mutual interactions. In the following, we will briefly 
sketch examples of such contexts. Again, we will stress the interaction between 
different entities in the architecture of a complex cognitive system involving the 
spatial environment, the cognitive agent, and an external representation structure. In 
this way, the agent will be the focus of attention as he contributes the cognitively 
active parts of the overall system. Contexts are then determined through cognitive 
functions that are involved in the interactions of the architectural components. To this 
end it becomes possible to relate the definition of (spatial) context to work in 
cognitive science and approaches of research on ontologies. A process-oriented 
characterization of context is a necessary requirement for the integration of context 
concepts in modern information systems. We will provide a short classification of 
spatial contexts and exemplify their role for the domain of wayfinding.  
9
4.1 Situation context 
The spatial situation context of an object or of an agent is the spatial structure in the 
physical environment that this object or agent is embedded in. The available physical, 
perceptual, or cognitive processes will determine which structures influence a given 
situation and thus must be considered as part of the respective spatial context. For 
example, the relevant situation context for the movements of an amoeba consists of 
those spatial structures in the spatial vicinity of the amoeba that affect its motion 
pattern. For cognitive agents, the relevant spatial situation context varies depending 
on the focus if interest: are we interested in visual influences, auditory influences, or 
in the agent’s disposition with respect to air flow and its temperature, or in a 
combination of various relevant factors. From a cognitive perspective we would argue 
that the relevancy of factors is determined by their role for the conceptualization 
process of the cognitive agent, i.e. the instantiation of a representation that takes into 
account several sources. This form of representation has been discussed under various 
names, for example, current conceptual representation (Habel, 2003), conceptual 
structure (Jackendoff, 1997), current spatial representation (Klippel et al., 2003). We 
will briefly describe the approaches from the domain of wayfinding and route 
directions that exemplify a formalization of simple conceptualization processes. 
Duckham and Kulik (Duckham & Kulik, 2003) expand an approach by (Mark, 
1985) on calculating a simplest paths. The general idea is to find a path in a network 
of paths that matches the criterion of being easy to describe. This approach is in 
contrast to other approaches that calculate, for example, the shortest connection 
between two locations. Conceptualization processes are a precondition for (verbal) 
descriptions of routes and verbalizations can be used as a window to these 
conceptualizations. The formalization of the “ease of description” by Mark (1985) can 
therefore be seen as a formalization of a conceptualization process, hence providing a 
formal description of a spatial context in the sense used in this article. The frame with 
slots that Mark uses for the characterization of actions at intersections and 
corresponding descriptions is the specification of a spatial context. 
A similar yet antipodal approach is taken by Richter and Klippel (2005). Instead of 
providing a single description for finding the best matching paths in a network, a 
variety of descriptions is given to find the best conceptualizations for a given route. 
Each conceptualization is suited to identify and characterize a spatial context. 
4.2 Mental context 
Processes in the mental representation of spatial environments are affected not only 
by perceptions of the environment but also by activated memory contents (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986). For example, if a human cognitive agent has been mentally engaged 
in the dangers of wildlife, she or he will be more likely to suspect and associate 
dangerous creatures with natural spatial environments than otherwise. This mental 
spatial context may be activated by certain features in the environmental context, but 
it is independent of the fact whether or not wild animals actually exist in the perceived 
environment. 
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4.3 Map context 
Accordingly, map context relates to spatial entities in the map that may affect the map 
generation and interpretation processes. For map generation, these may be entities that 
influence the map generalization process; for map interpretation, these may be entities 
that capture the map reader’s attention. 
4.4 Other contexts relevant in spatial reasoning, action, interaction 
Our representation-theoretic characterization was restricted to the three sources of 
spatial information E, A, and M. However, if we augment the model, for example to 
include natural language as a source of information about space, a language context 
will get involved. 
Not only the system components themselves but also their interactions can be used 
to define contexts. For example, an experienced map reader will apply different map 
interpretation processes than a novice; thus, the substructure (Frank, 2000) defines a 
context in which certain interpretations are generated while others are not. Or in the 
communication between two agents that each engage their own language with 
personal vocabulary and personal background knowledge, a specific communication 
context is created in which certain types of exchanges that are suited to this context 
are generated while others are not. 
5 Application 
In a more or less static environment the location of the wayfinder will change during a 
physical wayfinding process; thus, at least the location is of spatio-temporal nature. A 
location-aware, location-adaptive, or location-based system interacts with the 
wayfinder and reacts to a change of her location at the same time. This means that 
location is used with the characteristics of a context as defined in the ubiquitous 
computing literature.  
Location per se is not a context. We can assume location to exist independently of 
a perceiving mind. But it is the perceiving mind that identifies gestalt and affordance 
in the signals of perceptions of the environment and applies cognitive processes to 
focalize (Bal, 1997) experience of space either in internal cognitive representations or 
in external representations. In other words, the focalizer uses location to create a 
spatial context. Thereby the same location can be used to create different spatial 
contexts. 
We will now discuss the creation of spatial context from location by our process-
oriented perspective, applying the principles introduced above. 
5.1 Location and environment 
Each subject (wayfinder) and object (e.g., her mobile device) has a unique location in 
the physical world at each point in time. This location can be specified in terms of a 
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three-dimensional body in relation to the rest of the spatial environment. Each body 
can be imposed with axes, giving it an orientation, and a center (frequently abstracted 
as position of the entire object). We consider location to specify a relation to other 
objects, while position specifies a relation in an (otherwise empty) reference frame. 
Location and position can be determined by perception and / or computation. Bodies 
can move, and thus, location can change. Individual body movements can be quite 
complex, and hence, are typically generalized and abstracted in mental representations 
(e.g., {activity, start, end} or {activity, start, direction}) and external representations 
(e.g., trajectories).  
5.2 Location and wayfinder’s mind 
The perceiving mind of a wayfinder focalizes location into a spatial context of I-am-
here. The internal spatio-temporal concept of I-am-here-now extremely depends on 
other contexts. A child playing hide-and-seek will have a relatively detailed idea of I-
am-here, and a person experiencing ‘Europe-in-ten-days’ will have a relative coarse 
idea, maybe two-dimensional if not one-dimensional (see also Read & Budiarto, 
2003), even if both share the same location. They have a different perspective on their 
immediate environment, and they perceive different entities in their environment, in 
terms of potential activities. The same is true, for example, for a pedestrian and a 
bicyclist, who are at the same location. 
A primitive agent without cognitive capabilities (see Section 3.1) is a purely 
reactive agent. Sensed physical affordances lead to hard-wired motor actions. With no 
cognitive processes involved, the agent is located, but establishes no spatial context.  
A cognitive agent without a mental representation of its environment can perceive 
gestalt and affordances (see Section 3.2), and will focalize perceptions at least to a 
level of planning and controlling future actions. Spatial context is minimal, but 
depends fully on these cognitive processes; these processes, in turn, depend on the 
embodiment of the cognizer: a wheeled robot plans and controls actions differently 
then a legged robot, for example.  
A cognitive agent with mental representation of her environment (see Section 3.3) 
focalizes perceptions to an internal representation; the agent establishes 
representations of the relationships of her body to other bodies in the environment 
depending on current cognitive processes. Hence, location is transformed in 
(complex) spatial context.  
5.3 Location and external map 
An external map represents location of a moving agent typically by reducing the 
notion to position. A familiar representation of position on a map is a point in a two-
dimensional space, a projection of the earth’s surface to a plane surface. The point is 
characterized by coordinates in a specific spatial reference system (the mapping 
system), and possibly by a covariance matrix describing positional accuracy. In an 
alternative form of representation, position can be characterized qualitatively (e.g., in 
sketch maps). 
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In these cases, location is constructed by means of positioning techniques. The 
location of the mobile positioning device is only an approximation of the location of 
the wayfinder, since they are two different bodies and use two different sensing 
techniques to derive their position. Depending on the respective positioning 
technology of a device, its position can be represented by GPS coordinates, cell IDs of 
a wireless communication network, or coordinates matched to a particular travel 
network (Schiller & Voisard, 2004; Scott-Young & Kealy, 2002). Furthermore, the 
current location of the positioning device – which becomes the location on the map – 
can differ from the location represented on the map, due to inaccurate or outdated 
positioning. 
So far, we have considered position as a representative of location. Nevertheless, 
by putting the position on a map the map making agent establishes relations between 
represented objects and the current position of the agent. The agent does this by 
applying cartographic variables like selection, accentuation, generalization, or 
displacement. The controlled application of these variables is, again, focalization, 
based on cognitive processes. 
6 Conclusions 
Nevertheless, the definitions of context hedge to render the term more precise and 
rather add aspects to it. The current paper tried a different approach by focusing on 
spatial context and relying on cognitive processes as a means for defining context. 
The general approach taken is a representation-theoretic characterization of the 
trilateral interactions that take place when a cognitive agent is active in an 
environment aided by a map-like representation. 
In this article we considered the notion of spatial context in terms of cognitive 
processes involved in the interaction between cognitive agents, spatial environments, 
and cartographic maps. Defining spatial context through cognitive processes 
(especially spatial cognitive processes) allows for the integration of several currently 
discussed topics, for example, principles of embodied cognition, such as cognitive 
off-loading (Wilson, 2002), that are regarded as most useful in spatial tasks. Our 
approach develops a framework for context to demonstrate the relationships between 
environmental spatial context, mental spatial context, and map spatial context for a 
wayfinder.  
The presented formal method constitutes an operational approach to characterize 
specific spatial contexts involved in cognitive interactions. Our method does not 
incorporate user studies regarding specific features or aspects that may have to be 
taken into account in cognitive modeling; rather, it presents the architecture of a 
model for cognitive processing into which the results of such studies easily can be 
incorporated. Categories of context are formed through the type of knowledge 
engaged in the cognitive processes, not by ad-hoc decisions. This representation-
theoretic approach makes the representation relations between different cognitively 
relevant domains explicit and can be applied to other aspects of context equally well 
and will clarify the notions of context in the corresponding approaches. 
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